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I. INTRODUCTION 
Litigation can be very expensive.  The familiar “American 
Rule” followed in Minnesota and many other jurisdictions holds 
that each side bears its own attorneys’ fees and costs.1  The 
attorneys’ fees associated with bringing an action are often a major 
factor in determining whether to bring a claim at all.  Similarly, the 
attorneys’ fees for both plaintiffs and defendants weigh heavily in 
the cost-benefit analysis of whether and at what cost to ultimately 
settle a lawsuit.   There are,  however,  many  recognized exceptions 





       †     Principal at Minneapolis law firm Gray Plant Mooty 
 1. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 
(1975) (“In the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to 
collect a reasonable attorneys’ fee from the loser.”); Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 
302, 314 (Minn. 2000) (holding that under Minnesota’s common law, “each party 
bears [its] own attorney fees in the absence of a statutory or contractual 
exception”).  
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by statute,2 procedural rules,3 common law,4 or the terms of a 
contract.5 
The underlying policy rationale for fee-shifting statutes and 
other fee-shifting mechanisms is sometimes grounded in the 
concept of making an injured party whole.  As one scholar notes: 
Another argument for fee shifting that has a strong 
intuitive appeal is that refusing to award fees denies a 
wronged party full compensation for his injury. . . .  
Undeniably, the American rule’s effect of reducing a 
successful plaintiff’s recovery by the amount of his lawyer’s 
fee conflicts with the make-whole idea underlying much 
of the law of remedies.6 
 
 2. See 3 MARY FRANCES DERFNER & ARTHUR D. WOLF, COURT AWARDED 
ATTORNEY FEES chs. 29–48 (2012); ALAN HIRSCH & DIANE SHEEHEY, FED. JUD. CTR., 
AWARDING ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND MANAGING FEE LITIGATION 1 n.3 (2d ed. 2005), 
available at http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/attfees2.pdf; see also Marek v. 
Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 23 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Congress has enacted 
well over 100 attorney’s fees statutes.”). 
 3. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (signing of pleadings, motions, and other 
documents in violation of the rule), 16(f) (noncompliance with rules relating to 
pretrial conferences), 26(g) (certification of discovery requests, responses, and 
objections), 30(g)(1) (failure of party noticing deposition to attend), 30(g)(2) 
(failure of party noticing deposition to properly serve the witness), 37(a)(4) 
(conduct necessitating motion to compel discovery), 37(b) (failure to obey 
discovery orders), 37(d) (failure to make discovery), 56(h) (summary judgment 
affidavits made in bad faith).   
 4. See DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 2, chs. 2–4; 1 ROBERT L. ROSSI, 
ATTORNEYS’ FEES chs. 7–8 (3d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2012).  Two of the most widely 
recognized exceptions are the common-benefit doctrine and the bad-faith 
exception.  See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980); Boeing Co. v. 
Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472 (1980); Milner v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 725 N.W.2d 138, 
145 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (“The lodestar method is appropriate in cases that 
secure a public or common benefit although damages may be small . . . .”); First 
Constr. Credit Inc. v. Simonson Lumber of Waite Park, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 14, 19 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (“The district court has the discretion to award costs, 
disbursements, and reasonable attorney fees if a party acted in bad faith.”); Heller 
v. Schwan’s Sales Enters., 548 N.W.2d 287, 291 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (“This 
method of allocating attorneys’ fees as a proportion of the recovery for each class 
member is acceptable as an application of the common-fund doctrine.”).  In 
Minnesota, for example, an insured is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs incurred 
in establishing coverage where the insurer breaches its obligation to defend the 
insured.  See In re Silicone Implant Ins. Coverage Litig., 667 N.W.2d 405, 422–23 
(Minn. 2003). 
 5. See ROSSI, supra note 4, ch. 9; TINA L. STARK, NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING 
CONTRACT BOILERPLATE 375 (2003) (“Many types of commercial contracts contain 
provisions that shift responsibility for the payment of transaction costs, either 
generally or with respect to specific items.”).  
 6. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical 
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 657 (1982); see also Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley 
2
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Consistent with the make-whole concept, there is no reason 
that fee-shifting is necessarily limited to traditional outside counsel.  
In addition to outside counsel, fee-shifting may be appropriate for 
the recovery of “in-house” legal fees, such as corporate counsel.  
Fee-shifting awards may also be appropriate for government 
lawyers, representation of nonprofit organizations, and even 
representation of clients in pro bono matters.  Careful evaluation 
of whether such fees are recoverable can not only potentially boost 
the ultimate recovery, but also significantly change the litigation 
and settlement dynamics.  This article explores whether and to 
what extent such fees may be recovered. 
II. THE LODESTAR METHOD 
The starting point for evaluating potential recovery of in-house 
attorneys’ fees is the rules that govern the more common type of 
attorneys’ fees awards.  Awards of attorneys’ fees are typically 
determined by the “lodestar” method (i.e., the number of hours 
reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate).7  
Like many jurisdictions, Minnesota follows the lodestar method.8  
Factors considered in determining reasonableness under 
Minnesota law include: “the time and labor required; the nature 
and difficulty of the responsibility assumed; the amount involved 
and the results obtained; the fees customarily charged for similar 
legal services; the experience, reputation, and ability of counsel; 
and the fee arrangement between counsel and the client.”9  Of 
 
Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986) (“[T]he aim of such [fee-
shifting] statutes was to enable private parties to obtain legal help in seeking 
redress for injuries resulting from the actual or threatened violation of specific 
federal laws.”); Delgadillo v. Astrue, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1246 (D. Colo. 2007) 
(“The purpose of fee-shifting statutes is to free the litigant from burdensome 
expenses that might chill assertion of valid claims.”); Shuette v. Beazer Homes 
Holdings Corp., 124 P.3d 530, 547 (Nev. 2005) (holding that recovery of 
attorneys’ fees is “intended to compensate the claimant for legal fees incurred 
when he or she is forced to institute a court action to resolve a valid constructional 
defect claim by shifting the fees to the defendant”). 
 7. DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 2, ch. 16.01.   
 8. Milner, 748 N.W.2d at 620 (citing Specialized Tours, Inc. v. Hagen, 392 
N.W.2d 520, 542 (Minn. 1986), which approves of the “sensible and fair approach” 
set forth in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983)). 
 9. Id. at 621 (quoting State v. Paulson, 290 Minn. 371, 373, 188 N.W.2d 424, 
426 (1971)); see also City of Maple Grove v. Marketline Constr. Capital, LLC, 802 
N.W.2d 809, 819 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Paulson, 290 Minn. at 373, 188 
N.W.2d at 426); Green v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. A11-581, 2011 Minn. App. 
LEXIS 1089, at *24 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2011).   
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these factors, “Minnesota courts consider the results obtained 
critical to the fee award.”10  In some circumstances, the lodestar 
may be enhanced or reduced depending on the success.11  “[A]n 
upward adjustment of the lodestar amount is warranted only in 
rare cases of exceptional success.”12 
III. RECOVERY OF IN-HOUSE ATTORNEYS’ FEES 
A. Are In-House Counsel Fees Recoverable? 
Because in-house lawyers are salaried and typically do not bill 
their clients for their services, the initial issue is whether the costs 
associated with those services are recoverable from an adverse 
party.  A number of state and federal courts have permitted the 
recovery of in-house attorneys’ fees.13  Recovery of such fees has 
 
 10. First State Bank of Floodwood v. Jubie, 86 F.3d 755, 761 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(citing Specialized Tours, 392 N.W.2d at 542). 
 11. Milner, 748 N.W.2d at 624 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 
(1984)).  Note that although success is not necessarily dependent on the amount 
at issue in the case, the amount may be relevant in determining the 
reasonableness of hours expended.  See Darula v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. A11-
1457, 2012 Minn. App. LEXIS 440, at *15 (Minn. Ct. App. May 21, 2012).  But see 
Green, 2011 Minn. App. LEXIS 1089, at *24 (“[W]e disagree that a district court 
should consider the amount involved in the litigation when awarding attorney 
fees,” as this approach may undermine the purpose of fee-shifting provisions.). 
 12. Milner, 748 N.W.2d at 624 (internal quotation marks omitted) (rejecting 
the district court’s award of a 1.5 multiplier for claims under section 177.27, 
subdivision 10 of the Minnesota Fair Labor Standards Act, where “the jury 
completely rejected the plaintiffs’ claim for millions of dollars in unpaid overtime 
compensation and the plaintiffs recovered no back pay or other monetary relief”).   
 13. See, e.g., Smith v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 959 F.2d 655, 
660–61 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming an award of sanctions under Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that included in-house counsel fees); Textor v. 
Bd. of Regents of N. Ill. Univ., 711 F.2d 1387, 1396 (7th Cir. 1983) (concluding 
that defendant with in-house counsel was entitled to share in attorneys’ fees award: 
“a prevailing party’s decision as to how to engage counsel should have no bearing 
upon the court’s decision to punish malfeasant counsel”); Pittsburgh Plate Glass 
Co. v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 281 F.2d 538, 542 (3d Cir. 1960) (awarding 
reasonable fees for in-house counsel in an insurance contract case); Rodriquez v. 
City of New York, 721 F. Supp. 2d 148, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Nor is there any 
problem with awarding attorneys’ fees to in-house counsel if such fees would be 
awarded for the same work performed by outside counsel.”  (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 199 F. Supp. 2d 964, 
965, 969 (D. Neb. 2002) (awarding plaintiff attorneys’ fees, which included fees 
for in-house counsel, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. R Bar 
of Manhattan, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 656, 660–61 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (awarding in-house 
attorneys’ fees pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505); Perez v. Velez, 629 F. Supp. 734, 736–
38 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (awarding fees to corporate counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 1988); 
4
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been allowed in Minnesota.14  As the California Supreme Court 
explained: 
We discern no basis for discriminating between counsel 
working for a corporation in-house and private counsel 
engaged with respect to a specific matter or on retainer.  
Both are bound by the same fiduciary and ethical duties 
to their clients.  Both are qualified to provide, and do 
provide, equivalent legal services.  And both incur 
attorney fees and costs within the meaning of Civil Code 
section 1717 in enforcing the contract on behalf of their 
client.15 
Apart from the traditional in-house corporate context, a number of 
courts have awarded legal fees to lawyers representing government 
agencies,16 non-profit organizations,17 and even pro bono            
 
Scott Paper Co. v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 835, 837 (D. Del. 1984) 
(finding in-house counsel fees to be “reasonable attorney fees” under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 285 and concluding that there is no reason in law or equity why the client’s 
choice to proceed with some work through its own legal department was not 
recoverable); Johnston v. Detroit Hoist & Crane Co., 370 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1985) (noting that reasonable salary of in-house counsel attributable to work 
performed in products liability case may be awarded); Tesoro Petroleum Co. v. 
Coastal Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 754 S.W.2d 764, 766–67 (Tex. App. 1988) (concluding 
that award of attorneys’ fees for services of Coastal Refining Corporation’s in-
house counsel was proper and did not violate public policy or the Code of 
Professional Responsibility); Softsolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young Univ., 1 P.3d 
1095, 1106 (Utah 2000) (determining claimant “was required to pay consideration 
for the legal services received from its in-house counsel in the form of salary and 
other costs of employment” and “was entitled to attorney fees for the legal services 
of its in-house counsel”). 
 14. 3M Co. v. Mohan, Civ. No. 09-1413 ADM/FLN, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
5482, at *14–15 (D. Minn. Jan. 19, 2011); In re Trust of Great N. Iron Ore Props., 
311 N.W.2d 488, 493 (Minn. 1981) (permitting attorneys’ fee award for services of 
legal counsel and concluding that claimant “need not establish that it incurred 
additional expenses with respect to the employment of house counsel in order to 
justify an allowance for their services from the trust”). 
 15. PLCM Grp, Inc. v. Drexler, 997 P.2d 511, 517–18 (Cal. 2000) (footnote 
omitted) (citations omitted). 
 16. See, e.g., Textor, 711 F.2d at 1396 (permitting recovery of attorneys’ fees of 
salaried in-house counsel of university); United States v. Meyers, 363 F.2d 615, 621 
(5th Cir. 1966) (finding no sound reason to deny the government reimbursement 
“merely because the attorneys representing the United States are Government 
employees, and are paid a salary by the United States for performing their 
services”); In re Outdoor Sports Headquarters, Inc., 161 B.R. 414, 427 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ohio 1993) (rejecting the argument that the salary of the Special Assistant U.S. 
Attorney representing the Small Business Administration was an expense incurred 
without regard to the work required in the proceeding and hence not recoverable 
under the note at issue). 
 17. See, e.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 892–96 (1984) (concluding that in 
5
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matters.18  This is consistent with the concept that fee-shifting is to 
promote adequate representation and make the prevailing party 
whole.19 
Some courts, however, have found that in-house counsel fees 
are not recoverable.  One rationale for this position is that in-house 
attorneys’ fees are included within overhead.20  Another rationale 
for this position is that the attorney was acting in a “liaison” 
capacity between the lawyers working on the matter and the 
client.21   Thus,  where counsel acts more in the role of the client or 
relaying client views and instructions, the more likely such activities 
will be viewed as “liaison” activities and thus not recoverable.22 
 
a civil rights action, reasonable fees “are to be calculated according to prevailing 
market rates in relevant community regardless of whether plaintiff is represented 
by private or nonprofit counsel”); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 672 
F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (awarding attorneys’ fees to non-profit under federal 
statute); Consumer Union of U.S., Inc. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 
410 F. Supp. 63, 65 (D.D.C. 1975) (granting attorneys’ fees to non-profit consumer 
educational organization when litigation was conducted by in-house attorneys); 
Shapiro v. Chapman, 520 A.2d 1330, 1334 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (concluding 
the prevailing party in a civil rights action is entitled to attorneys’ fees under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 even if they “were represented by publicly funded, non-profit law 
office”).   
 18. See, e.g., Brown v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 980 S.W.2d 675, 683–84 
(Tex. App. 1998) (holding state bar represented by private lawyers on a pro bono 
basis may recover reasonable attorneys’ fees); see also John F. Amer, Attorney’s Fees 
for In-House Counsel in Contract Actions, 23 L.A. LAW. 24, 26 (2000) (“Drexler’s 
reasoning supports recovery of fees in a multitude of situations, including pro 
bono representation, discounted rates, contingency fees, and other fee 
arrangements.  The decision also appears to have resolved in the affirmative 
whether a governmental entity can recover attorney’s fees for services performed 
by its own, salaried attorney as the prevailing party in a contract action.”). 
 19. See Rowe, Jr., supra note 6, at 657.   
 20. See Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1499 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(holding that under Florida law, attorneys’ fees are recoverable as a matter of 
indemnification, and since the company did not pay out additional money for the 
services of in-house counsel, it could not claim reimbursement for this pro-rata 
share of its fixed corporate expense); see also In re Cummins Util., L.P., 279 B.R. 
195, 207 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002) (denying motion for in-house counsel fees on 
the grounds that “[t]his item should be included in . . . overhead”). 
 21. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bender, 182 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(reversing and remanding award of in-house attorneys’ fees, in part, on the 
grounds that “it is not possible to determine, from the FDIC’s submissions, how 
much of the time in-house counsel did devote was in a capacity other than that of 
a mere liaison between the agency and the Justice Department attorneys who 
represented it in this case, a function for which the recovery of fees is not 
permitted”); Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 761 F.2d 553, 558 
(9th Cir. 1985) (“Of course, if in-house counsel are not actively participating (e.g., 
acting only as liaison), fees should not be awarded.”). 
 22. See El Dorado Irrigation Dist. v. Trayler Bros., Inc., NO. CIV. S-03-949 
6
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Where, however, in-house counsel is experienced as to the 
matters at issue and actively participates in the litigation, such fees 
have been found to be reasonable and recoverable.  The rationale 
is that if in-house attorneys “had refrained from activity, the 
workload and consequently the fee application of [outside counsel] 
would have been increased.”23  Moreover, such fees are recoverable 
on the grounds that for every hour that in-house counsel spent on 
the matter, the client lost an hour of legal services that could have 
been spent on other matters.24 
B. How Is the Amount of In-House Attorneys’ Fees Computed? 
Most courts award attorneys’ fees for services provided by in-
house counsel by computing the value of their services in the same 
manner as fees are computed for outside counsel, which is referred 
to as the market value or market rate approach.25  This is basically 
the familiar “lodestar” method (i.e., the number of hours 
 
LKK/GGH, 2007 WL 512428, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007) (deducting from fee 
application the hours in-house counsel “appears to have been acting as a client 
representative and not as an attorney”). 
 23. Scott Paper Co. v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 835, 837 (D. Del. 
1984). 
 24. See Softsolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young Univ., 1 P.3d 1095, 1106 (Utah 
2000) (“[Claimant] was required to pay consideration for the legal services 
received from its in-house counsel in the form of salary and other costs of 
employment” and was “entitled to attorney fees for the legal services of its in-house 
counsel.”). 
 25. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Cartage Co., 76 F.3d 
114, 115–16 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding pension fund represented by in-house 
counsel entitled to attorneys’ fees at market value); Milgard Tempering, 761 F.2d at 
558 (instructing district court on remand to examine the “modern trend” toward 
calculating fees based on market rate); Cottman Transmission Sys., Inc. v. Martino, 
Nos. CIV.A. 92-7245, CIV.A. 92-2131, CIV.A. 92-2253, 1993 WL 541680, at *15 
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1993) (“The Third Circuit has indicated that there is nothing 
improper about a market rate calculation for attorney fee awards for salaried in 
house counsel.”), vacated on other grounds, 36 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 1994); Zacharias v. 
Shell Oil Co., 627 F. Supp. 31, 34 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (“Compensating in-house or 
salaried employees by using an hourly rate is commonly used by courts in 
awarding attorneys’ fees.”); PLCM Grp. v. Drexler, 997 P.2d 511, 517, 519 (Cal. 
2000) (approving of a calculation of in-house attorneys’ fees based on the 
“prevailing market rate”); Balkind v. Telluride Mountain Title Co., 8 P.3d 581, 588 
(Colo. App. 2000) (“Salaried and public interest attorneys should be awarded 
attorney fees based on the prevailing market rate rather than a ‘cost-plus’ 
approach focusing on the attorney’s salary.”); AMX Enters., L.L.P. v. Master Realty 
Corp., 283 S.W.3d 506, 519 (Tex. App. 2009) (“We are persuaded by the logic of 
those jurisdictions that apply the market value method to calculate in-house 
counsel’s attorney’s fees.  The market value method has the virtue of being 
predictable for the parties and easy to administer.”). 
7
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reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate).26  
Other courts award fees using a “cost-plus” method.27  Regardless of 
which method is ultimately used, the burden is on the party seeking 
the award to meet all of the applicable elements.  It is therefore 
important to be familiar with the rules and applicable factors for 
recovering in-house counsel fees, as well as developing a game plan 
for meeting those factors throughout the course of the litigation. 
1. Lodestar or Market Rate Method 
Courts favoring the market value approach view it as being 
more predictable for the parties and easier to administer, while the 
cost-plus approach is viewed as cumbersome, intrusive, and costly, 
distorting the incentives for settlement and rewarding 
inefficiency.28  In order to establish the hours reasonably expended, 
in-house counsel should maintain contemporaneous time records 
in sufficient detail to demonstrate what services were provided.29  
 
 26. See DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 2, ch. 16.01 (quoting Hensley v. 
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). 
 27. Softsolutions, 1 P.3d at 1107 (“We are convinced that a cost-plus rate is the 
more reasonable measure of attorney fees to in-house counsel, and is consistent 
with the public policy that the basic purpose of attorney fees is to indemnify the 
prevailing party and not to punish the losing party by allowing the winner a 
windfall profit.”); see also PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 
F.2d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Goodrich v. Dep’t of the Navy, 733 F.2d 1578, 
1579–80 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 
656 F.2d 848, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Lacer v. Navajo Cnty., 687 P.2d 400, 404 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1984). 
 28. See Balkind, 8 P.3d at 588 (“Salaried and public interest attorneys should 
be awarded attorney fees based on prevailing market rate rather than a ‘cost-plus’ 
approach focusing on the attorney’s salary.”); see also Amer, supra note 18, at 26 
(“By refusing to distinguish between private counsel and other counsel in the 
determination of fee awards in contract actions, Drexler has removed one nasty 
element of today’s contentious litigation by obviating any basis for full-scale 
discovery of corporate counsel’s compensation or any other confidential attorney-
client fee arrangement.”).   
 29. Fair Isaac Corp. v. Experian Info. Solutions Inc., 711 F. Supp. 2d 991, 
1008 (D. Minn. 2010) (“In support of its fee request, Trans Union submitted a 
table displaying the number of hours spent on seven different categories of tasks: 
(1) analysis and investigation of the breach allegations; (2) work in connection 
with securing a protective order regarding algorithms; (3) work on a motion to 
compel Fair Isaac to specify the trade secret that was allegedly misappropriated; 
(4) discovery related to the breach of contract claim; (5) working with experts; (6) 
work on the motion for summary judgment; and (7) preparation of the pending 
motion for fees.  In addition, Trans Union has submitted the supporting billing 
entries, showing in detail the work Trans Union’s attorneys performed relating to 
the breach of contract claim.”). 
8
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This is basically no different from what outside counsel routinely 
submit in support of a fee application.  Courts are used to seeing 
fairly detailed submissions that accompany fee applications and 
may reduce or outright deny a claim for in-house counsel fees 
where time records are vague, incomplete, or created after the 
fact.30  The submissions should include the identity of the attorney 
who rendered the services, a description of the services provided, 
and the amount of time devoted to the matter.31  Care must be 
taken not to simply dump voluminous time records on the court 
without an explanation of the rates charged or an explanation of 
the services rendered.32  To the extent that one or more of the 
 
 30. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bender, 182 F.3d 1, 5–6 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (reversing and remanding award of in-house attorneys’ fees, in part, on the 
grounds that the time in-house counsel devoted to the case was insufficiently 
documented); In re Donovan, 877 F.2d 982, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (requiring “that 
fee applications include contemporaneous time records of hours worked and rates 
claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of the work with 
supporting documents, if any”); 3M Co. v. Mohan, Civ. No. 09-1413 ADM/FLN, 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5482, at *16–17 (D. Minn. Jan. 19, 2011) (finding the 
lodestar amount not entirely reasonable because “some hours claimed by both 
Merchant & Gould and 3M in house counsel are not fully documented[; f]or 
example, over 150 Merchant & Gould hours are broadly listed as ‘trial 
preparation,’ and in-house counsel’s hours are largely estimated.”); United States 
ex rel. Thompson v. Walgreen Co., 621 F. Supp. 2d 710, 728 (D. Minn. 2009) 
(“Based on the Court’s line-by-line review, the Court recommends a reduction in 
the amount of $40,000, or approximately 8% of the total requested amount for 
fees and costs, to account for billing entries so vague that the Court is unable to 
determine whether or not the hours claimed were justified.”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. 
R Bar of Manhattan, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 656, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[M]otions for 
attorney’s fees must be based on contemporaneous time records specifying 
relevant dates, time spent and work done,” and “hindsight review is not an 
adequate substitute for contemporaneous time records.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Ward v. Brown, 899 F. Supp. 123, 128 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (reducing 
claim when no contemporaneous records were kept on the grounds that “an after-
the-fact reconstruction presents the danger that the attorney’s memory, and his 
estimates of how long it would have taken to perform various tasks, could be 
faulty”); 301 Clifton Place L.L.C. v. 301 Clifton Place Condo. Ass’n, 783 N.W.2d 
551, 569 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (affirming attorneys’ fee award under section 
515B.4-116 of the Minnesota Common Interest Ownership Act based on “an 
affidavit with an attached spreadsheet showing detailed accounts of work 
performed and matching billing rates”).  
 31. See, e.g., AMX Enters., L.L.P. v. Master Realty Corp., 283 S.W.3d 506, 515 
(Tex. App. 2009) (in-house counsel submitted a sixteen-page affidavit in support 
of fee application, attached to which was sixteen pages of time entries reflecting 
work performed on the case through the end of trial); see also ROSSI, supra note 4, 
app. A, form 32. 
 32. See Bores v. Domino’s Pizza L.L.C., No. 05-2498 (RHK/JSM), 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 87252, at *15 n.8 (D. Minn. Oct. 27, 2008) (“Here, Dominos has 
(inappropriately) opted to dump on the Court the voluminous time records of its 
9
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underlying claims may be subject to recovery of attorneys’ fees and 
others may not, the attorneys’ time entries should clearly segregate 
time between legal work related to recoverable claims and non-
recoverable claims.33  The time entries should also delineate and 
exclude what arguably might be characterized as “liaison” 
activities.34  The failure to properly segregate may be fatal to the 
claim. 
In some instances, the party opposing the fee application may 
even retain an expert to audit the bills as part of the challenge to 
the fee application.35  Careful practitioners should therefore expect 
a vigorous examination of their fee applications, especially where 
large awards are at stake, and prepare a fee application that 
addresses anticipated issues. 
Keep in mind that the attorneys’ time records may have to be 
produced in discovery as part of the fee award application 
process.36  Therefore, to the extent possible, the time records 
should describe what was done, but not reveal the substance of 
 
counsel, with little explanation concerning the hourly rates charged and even less 
explanation of the propriety of the hours expended.”).   
 33. See, e.g., Sw. Stainless, L.P. v. Sappington, No. 07-CV-0334-CVE-TLW, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36211, at *24–26 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 13, 2010) (requiring 
apportionment between fee-bearing and non-fee-bearing claims); AMX Enters., 283 
S.W.3d at 522–23 (remanding the matter to the trial court because the claimant 
failed to segregate fees or demonstrate that the fees associated with recoverable 
claims were so intertwined with the non-recoverable claims that the fees need not 
be segregated). 
 34. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill. v. Millard Refrigerated Servs., No. 
8:00CV91, 2002 WL 2005717, at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 3, 2002) (plaintiff appropriately 
did not seek attorneys’ fees for time spent in various meetings as a mere liaison); 
Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1052 (D. Minn. 
2001), aff’d, 290 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Declaration of Hildy Bowbeer in 
Support of Claim for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses at ¶ 7, 3M Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 5482 (Civ. No. 09-1413 ADM/FLN), Doc. No. 216 (“In addition, in this case 
I and other members of the 3M in-house legal staff played a significant role in 
accomplishing tasks that otherwise would have been performed, and billed, by 
outside counsel.  These tasks went far beyond the typical in-house counsel’s role as 
‘liaison’ between outside counsel and our business client.”).  See generally 1 
DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 2, ch. 12.   
 35. See, e.g., King v. Turner, No. 05-388 (JRT/FLN), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
30214, at *5 (D. Minn. Apr. 24, 2007) (“Defendant submitted an affidavit of James 
P. Schratz that audits the fee request, and argues that the hours expended should 
be reduced as indicated in the auditor’s report.”).   
 36. See 2 DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 2, ch. 25; EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 72–75 (4th ed. 
2001).  But see Fair Isaac Corp. v. Experian Info. Solutions Inc., 711 F. Supp. 2d 
991, 1008 n.4 (D. Minn. 2010) (permitting in camera submission of billing entries 
for review by the court).   
10
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attorney-client communications or attorney work product.  It may 
be possible to redact sensitive entries prior to producing them or 
submitting them to the court, but there is a risk that the redactions 
will be successfully challenged, thereby potentially exposing 
privileged communications or work product.  Heavy redaction, on 
the other hand, may lead the court to conclude that time was not 
reasonably necessary.37 
As part of the fee application, it is necessary to establish a 
reasonable hourly rate for the attorney, including for in-house legal 
services.38  “When determining a reasonable hourly rate, the 
relevant legal community is the forum in which the district court 
sits.”39  For outside counsel, this is sometimes accomplished 
through the use of comparable billing rate surveys.40  These are 
usually specific to a geographical area and are typically broken 
down by size of firm, type of activity (e.g., business law, corporate 
law, litigation, real estate, estate planning), and year the attorney 
was admitted to practice.  Supporting affidavits from professional 
colleagues in the legal community with similar practices have also 
been used to support the reasonableness of hourly rates.41  These 
 
 37. See Bores, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87252, at *23 (“Similarly, Dominos’ 
counsel has heavily redacted the time sheets submitted with the Motion, and those 
redactions generally leave the Court in the dark as to the precise nature of the 
work performed.  Courts routinely reduce fee requests where redactions leave it 
impossible to discern the appropriateness of counsel’s work.”).  Where heavy 
redaction is necessary, it is advisable to submit the unredacted time records to the 
court in camera.  Id. at *23–24.   
 38. See Zacharias v. Shell Oil Co., 627 F. Supp. 31, 35 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (“[In-
house counsel’s] hourly billing rate was carefully calculated by determining the 
value of his service in Shell’s in-house legal department.”). 
 39. Fair Isaac, 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1009 (“The rates charged by Trans Union’s 
Chicago lawyers are substantially higher than the rates charged by its Minneapolis 
lawyers with comparable years of experience.”); see also Bores, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
87252, at *18–19 (“Dominos has made no attempt to justify the use of out-of-town 
counsel (with very high rates) to assist it in this matter. . . .  Nor does the Court 
believe that these hourly rates are in line with those charged by lawyers of similar 
skill and experience in the Twin Cities area.”). 
 40. See B-K Lighting, Inc. v. Vision3 Lighting, No. CV 06-02825 MMM (PLAx), 
2009 WL 3838264, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2009) (“Courts also frequently use 
survey data in evaluating the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees.”); Milner v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch., 748 N.W.2d 608, 622 (Minn. 2008) (concluding that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that hourly rates charged 
by plaintiffs’ attorneys were reasonable based on a “detailed study,” which 
“evidenc[ed] that their respective hourly rates are comparable to those charged by 
equally competent attorneys and paralegals in their respective communities” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).   
 41. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Walgreen Co., 621 F. Supp. 2d 710, 714 
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methods are not readily available to in-house counsel.  Comparable 
billing rates may, however, be established indirectly through billing 
rate surveys or fees charged by independent counsel.42  In addition, 
many companies routinely retain outside law firms on various types 
of matters and in different areas of the country.  The billing rates 
for these firms can be used as a surrogate to establish comparable 
billing rates for in-house legal services. 
2. Cost-Plus Approach 
A number of courts utilize the cost-plus approach for awards of 
in-house attorneys’ fees.43  The rationale for this approach is that 
the market-rate approach would award the salaried attorney’s 
employer with a windfall profit.44  Under the cost-plus approach, 
 
(D. Minn. 2009) (five affidavits from local attorneys submitted in support of 
reasonableness of hourly rate); Bores, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87252, at *19 
(“Typically, such evidence would include affidavits from other lawyers opining on 
the reasonableness of the rates or citations to similar cases in which fees were 
awarded.”); Turner v. Gonzales, Civ. No. 01-1407 JMR/AJB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
96420, at *24 (D. Minn. Nov. 20, 2007) (affidavit of James M. Gilbert, former 
Associate Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, submitted in support of 
plaintiff’s claim of success on the merits); King v. Turner, Civ. No. 05-388 
(JRT/FLN), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30214, at *4 (D. Minn. Apr. 24, 2007) (finding 
that two local attorneys who submitted affidavits in support of reasonable hourly 
rates were “well-qualified to opine on the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees in this 
jurisdiction”); Green v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, A11-581, 2011 Minn. App. LEXIS 
1089, at *23 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2011) (affirming fee award and noting that 
“[t]he district court considered the experience of the attorneys, the affidavit 
testimony of other attorneys in the community as to a reasonable hourly rate for 
the work performed, and attorney-fee orders in other Minnesota consumer-rights 
cases, all of which indicate attorney fees of $350 to $375 are within the range of 
market rates”).  But see In re UnitedHealth Grp. Inc. PSLRA Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 
1094, 1101–02 (D. Minn. 2009) (rejecting expert opinion submitted in support of 
fee award in securities case).   
 42. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. R Bar of Manhattan, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 656, 661 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[A]n hourly rate based on an estimate of the fee charged by 
independent counsel for similar services can provide a reasonable basis for 
calculating such an award if other relevant criteria are satisfied.”). 
 43. See, e.g., PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 
1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[I]n this circuit reasonable rates for in-house 
counsel may be calculated on cost plus overhead.”); Dana Corp. v. NOK, Inc., No. 
86-CV-74903-DT, 1988 WL 156807, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 16, 1988); In re Stewart 
v. Capital City Mortg. Corp., No. 00-00046, 02-10020, 2004 WL 3130573, at *16 
(Bankr. D.D.C. Nov. 10, 2004) (holding contract provision awarding attorneys’ 
fees “incurred” by prevailing party precluded application of market value method 
to calculate in-house counsel’s fees); Lacer v. Navajo Cnty., 687 P.2d 400, 404 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); Softsolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young Univ., 1 P.3d 1095, 
1107 (Utah 2000). 
 44. Softsolutions, 1 P.3d at 1107; see also Devine v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 
12
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fees for in-house counsel are limited to consideration actually paid 
or for which the party is obligated, calculated using a cost-plus rate.  
This methodology takes into account: (1) the proportionate share 
of the party’s attorney salaries, including benefits, which are 
allocable to the case based on the time expended; plus (2) 
allocated shares of the overhead expenses, which may include the 
costs of office space, support staff, office equipment and supplies, 
law library and continuing legal education, and similar expenses.  
Under the cost-plus method, it will still be necessary for the 
attorney to keep timely and accurate time records.  Moreover, it 
may be necessary to reveal attorneys’ salaries and benefits within 
the company or organization, which may be a sensitive issue.  In 
some instances, legal departments track their costs and charge 
them back to their clients.  This provides a ready basis for 
developing cost-plus information.  If not, it will likely be necessary 
to involve the financial or accounting department to develop the 
necessary data for presentation to the court. 
IV. PRACTICAL STEPS: BEST PRACTICES 
An award of attorneys’ fees is left to the sound discretion of 
the trial court and will only be reversed for an abuse of discretion.45  
Judicial scrutiny of applications for such awards varies widely and 
can be influenced by any number of factors.  In order to increase 
the chances of successfully recovering in-house legal fees, counsel 
should consider the practical steps and best practices set forth 
below. 
A. Expressly Include Recovery of In-House Fees in the Contract.  Fee-
shifting provisions are common in many contracts.  These 
provisions typically provide that a party may be liable for 
“reasonable attorneys’ fees” or “legal costs.”  These terms are 
frequently not defined.  At the contract drafting stage, it is 
important to make sure that the contract expressly provides for the 
recovery of in-house attorneys’ fees and perhaps the basis by which 
those fees will be computed.  In the event of a dispute, this will 
reduce the potential for an argument that in-house legal costs are 
 
805 F.2d 384, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (concluding that fee awards to unions should 
be limited to the union’s actual costs of litigation on the grounds that to award 
anything other than actual costs would be unethical because the union would get a 
windfall by receiving more than the litigation had actually cost the union). 
 45. See, e.g., Becker v. Alloy Hardfacing & Eng’g Co., 401 N.W.2d 655, 661 
(Minn. 1987). 
13
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not contemplated by the parties and thus are not recoverable.  
Even if the contract provides for the recovery of in-house fees, 
these fees are usually limited to the recovery of attorneys’ fees and 
costs associated with a breach or collection and post-judgment 
remedies.  There is no reason, however, why fee-shifting cannot be 
used in negotiating certain types of business transactions.  For 
example, a significant loan transaction may provide that if the 
borrower rejects the terms and conditions proposed by the lender 
and instead proposes extensive modifications, the borrower shall 
reimburse the lender for its reasonable in-house legal costs and 
expenses incurred in connection with the negotiations relating to 
modifications of the loan transaction. 
B. Identify the Nature of the Claims and Defenses at Issue.  At the 
outset of any litigation, it is important to identify the claims and 
defenses at issue in the litigation, whether those claims or defenses 
provide for recovery of attorneys’ fees, and, if so, under what 
conditions.  If it is a breach of contract case, check to see if there is 
a fee-shifting provision in the contract and, if so, whether it 
expressly includes in-house legal fees or is broad enough to include 
such fees.  If there is a statutory claim, check to see if attorneys’ fees 
are permitted and under what conditions.  Where the case has 
multiple claims or causes of action (some of which may allow for 
recovery of attorneys’ fees and some of which may not), time 
entries should reflect work on discrete aspects of the case (e.g., 
breach of contract claim, statutory claim).  That way, it is much 
easier to assemble the fee petition and for the court to easily 
distinguish between recoverable and non-recoverable work. 
C. Assess the Likely Methodology of Computing the In-House Counsel 
Award.  It is important to determine early in the case what method 
the court will most likely use in computing the fee award (e.g., 
lodestar or cost-plus).  If the fee-shifting provision permits recovery 
for legal costs “incurred,” it may be necessary to utilize the cost-plus 
approach. If cost-plus is the likely method, begin to develop an 
early strategy for assembling the necessary corporate or 
organizational financial data. If lodestar is the likely method, 
immediately begin to document time spent working on the matter 
and assemble comparable rate data. 
D. Take an Active Role in the Case.  The goal here is to 
demonstrate that in-house counsel provided substantive legal 
services on behalf of the client akin to those provided by outside 
counsel.  There are a variety of ways for in-house counsel to 
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss1/10
  
2012] FEE-SHIFTING 241 
establish active participation in the representation of the client.  
For example, it is possible for in-house counsel to be listed as “of 
counsel” on the pleadings or to be admitted pro hac vice for the 
matter.  Keep in mind, however, that a formal appearance in the 
proceeding subjects the attorney to all of the duties and 
responsibilities of trial counsel.  In addition, in-house counsel can 
actively participate in depositions and other discovery activities.  An 
appearance “on the record” at important hearings and trial may 
demonstrate active participation.  Time entries can also reflect 
substantive legal work, such as researching specific legal issues in 
the case, responding to discovery requests, drafting pleadings, and 
developing strategy for the case. 
E. Develop a Detailed Biography to Support the Hourly Role.  In-
house counsel should be prepared to provide the court his or her 
relevant experience and expertise in the matter at issue.  This is 
typically done through an affidavit or declaration describing the 
attorney’s professional background, practical experience, and role 
in the case.46  If in-house counsel brings particular expertise to the 
case (e.g., patent expertise for company products), that should be 
highlighted as well. 
F. Keep Contemporaneous Time Records.  Many lawyers who have 
transitioned to in-house positions are grateful to be relieved of the 
tedium of having to keep daily time sheets.  However, it is back to 
time sheets if in-house counsel expects a court to award those fees.  
Moreover, time records must be kept contemporaneously.  Post 
hoc reconstruction of the attorney’s services may very likely be 
rejected outright or result in a significantly reduced award.47  More 
detailed time entries may be required under the lodestar approach, 
but regardless, contemporaneous and accurate time records are 
essential to a successful award.  Some important tips: 
 
 46. See AMX Enters., L.L.P. v. Master Realty Corp., 283 S.W.3d 506, 520 (Tex. 
App. 2009) (noting that in-house counsel’s “affidavit and time records recited the 
time and labor required to represent AMX, the fee customarily charged in the 
locality for similar legal services, the amounts involved, [in-house counsel’s] 
experience and ability, and the reasonableness and necessity of fees”); see also 
DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 2, ch. 24.04. 
 47. See, e.g., Sw. Stainless, L.P. v. Sappington, No. 07-CV-0334-CVE-TLW, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36211, at *35–36 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 13, 2010) (“The Court finds 
that the timekeepers’ mere recollections about the time spent on specific tasks, 
many of which were performed over one year before the reconstruction, are not 
reliable.  Further, plaintiffs’ unreliable reconstructed time records remain 
imprecise and made it impossible for the Court to apportion fees by reviewing the 
records line by line.”). 
15
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 A daily log or timesheet should record the services provided to 
the client, including the identity of the attorney or paralegal 
involved in rendering the services. 
 Avoid “blocked billing.”  “The term ‘blocked billing’ refers to 
the ‘time-keeping method by which each lawyer and legal 
assistant enters the total daily time spent working on a case, 
rather than itemizing the time expended on specific tasks.’”48  
Some courts have noted that blocked billing is a problem in 
fee-shifting cases.49  Each entry should therefore identify a 
discrete task and record time devoted to that task.50 
 Use reasonable time increments.  The time allocated to a 
particular task should reflect the time actually spent working 
on the task rather than minimum billing increments.51 
 Avoid “over lawyering.”  Lawyers obviously need to 
communicate with one another, but some courts react 
negatively to what they perceive as over lawyering.  Examples 
include multiple conferences and numerous attorneys 




 48. Robinson v. City of Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275, 1284 n.9 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 49. See Role Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(reducing requested hours because counsel’s practice of blocked billing 
“lump[ed] together multiple tasks, making it impossible to evaluate their 
reasonableness”); Aranda v. Astrue, No. CV 08-340-MA, 2011 WL 2413996, at *5 
(D. Or. June 8, 2011) (“Blocked billing, which bundles tasks in a block of time, 
makes it extremely difficult for a court to evaluate the reasonableness of the 
number of hours expended.”); Okla. Natural Gas Co. v. Apache Corp., 355 F. 
Supp. 2d 1246, 1264 (N.D. Okla. 2004) (“Block billing is a critical problem where, 
for example, plaintiff alleges claims for which fees may be shifted and others for 
which fee-shifting is not appropriate.”).   
 50. See Stewart v. Capital City Mortg. Corp. (In re Stewart), No. 00-00046 
(Chapter 13), 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 2185, at *72 (Bankr. D.D.C. Nov. 10, 2004) 
(disallowing in-house attorneys’ fees because of “lumping”).   
 51. See Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 948–49 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(approving an across-the-board twenty percent reduction for time billed in 
quarter-hour increments for phone calls, email, or the preparation and review of 
letters or documents); Coronado v. Astrue, 1:10-cv-00594-AWI-SKO, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 55259, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2012) (“Six-minute billing increments, 
which is how Ms. Bosavanh’s time entries are recorded and presented, can be 
problematic when small tasks that require less than six minutes are recorded 
separately.  Six-minute billing increments can result in a rounding-up that over-
calculates the time actually spent on the tasks in total.”); Melone v. Paul Evert’s RV 
Country, Inc., Case No. 2:08-cv-00868-GWF, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47408, at *16 
(D. Nev. Apr. 4, 2012) (reducing hours by twenty percent for matters billed at 0.3 
and 0.4 hours).   
16
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 The time entries should demonstrate substantive legal work 
devoted to the matter (not “ministerial” activities).52 
 In-house activities that reflect “liaison” functions should be 
separately logged and excluded from the application.53 
 To the extent possible, comply with the organization’s billing 
guidelines or expectations for outside counsel.  Many 
companies have corporate policies regarding services 
rendered by outside counsel.  Some include detailed 
requirements regarding budgeting, staffing, fees, and time 
entries.  For example, some companies require outside 
counsel to charge time to activity or task codes, which are then 
submitted electronically.  While in-house counsel may not be 
subject to these requirements, the failure to follow corporate 
policies may undermine a successful fee application. 
 Where part of a claim may be subject to fee-shifting, but not 
another part, time entries should clearly segregate between 
recoverable and non-recoverable activities. 
G. Critically Scrutinize the Fee Application.  As noted above, courts 
have wide discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees.  The application 
for such an award is no less important than any other submission to 
the court.  It should clearly provide the legal and factual basis for 
the award, including supporting affidavits or declarations.  Tables 
summarizing voluminous statistical and financial information are 













 52. In re Stewart, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 2185, at *59 n.29, *65 (disallowing in-
house attorneys’ fees that were “ministerial in character requiring no significant 
attorney involvement” and “for lack of clarity and lack of specificity”).   
 53. Id. at *47 (“Attorney’s fees for services of in-house counsel who act 
primarily as liaisons between the client and outside counsel are not recoverable 
under a contractual or statutory provision for the recovery of attorney’s fees.”).   
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conservative effort to exclude from any application or petition fees 
that might be considered excessive, redundant, or otherwise 
unnecessary.54  The application should specifically describe any 
such reductions. 
 
 54. See, e.g., In re UnitedHealth Grp. Inc. PSLRA Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 
1106 (D. Minn. 2009) (“Counsel are expected to exercise billing judgment in their 
fee application, making a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours 
that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” (internal quotations and 
citation omitted)); see also Nelson v. Am. Home Assurance Co., No. 11-1161 
(RHK/FLN), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26982, at *5–7 (D. Minn. Mar. 1, 2012) 
(reducing plaintiffs’ fee petition of over $159,000 to $27,000, in part, on the 
grounds that the relatively small amount at issue and the “simple” issue in the 
matter should not “have necessitated the involvement of five separate attorneys, 
including one who billed as much as $480 per hour, as Plaintiffs’ fee request 
indicates”); Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 
1052 (D. Minn. 2001), aff’d, 290 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002).   
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